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Abstract: Although substantial research has examined the Saudi state’s symbiosis with the 
Islamic revivalist movement commonly known as ‘Wahhabism’, few studies have considered 
how the dynamics of state formation underpin this relationship. This article argues that a 
continuous and circular political logic has sat behind the Saudi state’s patronage of the 
revivalist movement since 1744 and proposes a four-stage model that explains how and why 
the regime has maintained this support over this prolonged period. This article first outlines 
this model, then presents a detailed analysis of its persistent presence in the development of 
Saudi state authority in order to highlight the recurrent manner by which the state often has 
constructed the spiritual concerns of revivalists to counter challenges to its authority, a 
pattern demonstrated most recently during the Arab Spring and the war in Yemen. The effects 
of this model will continue to shape the decisions, policies and perceptions of the Saudi 
political elite for the foreseeable future. 
Keywords: Charles Tilly; Identity; Religious revivalism; Saudi Arabia; State building; State 
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Since first emerging in the eighteenth century, Saudi governance has been synonymous with 
the co-option of the Najdi religious revivalist movement  to achieve political legitimacy and 
 2 
durability.1 Through its patronage of the movement in 1744, an otherwise unremarkable clan 
of oasis nobility was able to begin building a state that eventually would project over much of 
the Arabian Peninsula and which has persisted, albeit with two brief interruptions, ever 
since.2 Although this link between regime and religion universally is acknowledged in the 
literature on the Saudi state,3 few efforts in social science have sought explain the deeper 
logic of instrumentality behind it.4 Although historians, theologians and legal scholars have 
interrogated this relationship, we have minimal understanding as to how this operates as a 
process of politics or governance or how the assumptions of such a process may help to 
predict future state behaviour. 
This article investigates whether there has been a continuous political logic behind the Saudi 
state’s patronage of the revivalist movement over the past three centuries. It proposes a new 
conceptual model of this interplay that follows the logic of the state protection racketeering 
theory proposed by Charles Tilly,5 with physical risk substituted by ontological threat.  It 
argues that all incarnations of Saudi governance have sought to offer protections to the 
religious revivalist Wahhabi identity, while fomenting conditions in which these same 
protections become desirable in order ultimately to strengthen and expand the state. The 
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1 Examples include Commins, D. (2006) The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan).; and DeLong-Bas, N. J. (2004) Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, (New York: 
Oxford University Press).  
 
2 Vassiliev, A. (2000) The History Of Saudi Arabia, (London: Saqi Books). 
 
3 See al-Atawneh, M. (2009) Is Saudi Arabia a Theocracy? Religion and Governance in Contemporary Saudi 
Arabia, Middle Eastern Studies, 45(5), pp. 721-37.and Alsaid, T. (2013) Relationship between state and religion 
in Saudi Arabia: the role of Wahabism in governance, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 6(3), pp. 376-403. 
 
4 Two exceptions to this have been Shahi, A. (2013) The Politics of Truth Management in Saudi Arabia, 
(Hoboken: Taylor and Francais). and Firro, T. K. (2013) The Political Context of Early Wahhabi Discourse of 
Takfir, Middle Eastern Studies, 49(5), pp. 770-89. 
 
5 Tilly, C. (1985) War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in: Evans, P., Rueschermeyer, D. & Skocpol, 
T. (eds) Bringing the State Back In, pp. 169-87 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
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article begins by outlining the parameters of its proposed model. It then seeks to explain 
specific religio-political activities of the first, second and third states through the logic of the 
model. The article then concludes by showcasing the contemporary relevance of the model in 
the wake of the Arab Spring, arguing that a state-directed protection racket built around a 
revivalist-type identity continues to persist today. 
 
State racketeering  
The Saudi state’s sponsorship of religious revivalism can be interpreted as a protection racket 
built around a paradoxical simultaneous construction of and shielding against ontological 
insecurity, a concept defined as an ‘[in]security of being, a [lack] of confidence and trust that 
the world is what it appears to be.’6 This can be observed in the regime’s perennial emphasis 
of itself as the principal benefactor of the Wahhabi movement since 1744, while 
simultaneously placing the identity of that same movement in a state of insecurity and 
offering protection against this condition for various extractive prices: taxation, the provision 
of troops and, most importantly, compliance with the centre and its goals. The general trend 
of this racket has been the growth and maintenance of state legitimacy, or ‘a psychological 
property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to 
believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just.’7 This has enabled the Saudi regime to cultivate 
and consolidate state power over an expansive territory across a prolonged period to an extent 
unseen in the peninsula since the early Islamic Empire. This, in turn, has enabled the regime 
to maintain and reinforce the racketeering cycle itself, as considerable elements of extraction 
are redirected to ensure perpetuation.  
                                                          
6 Kinnvall, C. (2004) Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological 
Security, Political Psychology, 25(5), pp. 741-67. 
 
7 Tyler, T. R. (2006) Why people obey the law, (New Jersey: Princeton), p. 357 
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Based on the European experience, classical racketeering theory argues that the 
emergence of the modern state8 was the inadvertent outcome of pre-state elites establishing 
criminal protection rackets over their constituencies. These provided protections against 
international threats that these same rulers were complicit in generating. Despite being fought 
largely for the pursuits of noble and mercantile elites, the conflicts of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century Europe disproportionately impacted civilians.9 This, Tilly suggests, 
created a growing demand for reliable protection against outsiders. In response, many of the 
same war-making elites began to offer a military and policing shield for such a demand, as 
such protections helped to generate substantial return of extraction, notably taxation, 
conscription, and loyalty to the centre, which could help to fund further efforts of conquest, 
personal power and ultimately led to an inadvertent process of state building. The benefits 
and success of this strategy in turn incentivised the subsequent creation or fabrication of 
threats of external violence by these same protectors in order to facilitate further extraction, a 
cycle that would allow for the creation of permanent institutions of protection and the growth 
of the modern state through a process of racketeering.10 
At first glance, Tilly’s theory appears to lack relevance to the Saudi case, as little 
research indicates that a condition of wide-spread concern over the physical threats posed by 
outsiders preluded the formation of the first state in Najd.11 Indeed, Central Arabia was 
insulated from external wars, with only ephemeral, limited conflicts waged between isolated 
                                                          
8 Defined by Michael Mann as a large-scale territorial entity that possesses a centralised and institutionalised 
core holding a monopoly on authoritative rule-making and physical violence in Mann, M. (1984) The 
autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results, European Journal of Sociology / Archives 
Européennes de Sociologie, 25(02), pp. 185-213. 
 
9 Garfield, R. M. & Neugut, A. I. (1997) The Human Consequences of War, in: Levy, B. S. & Sidel, V. W. (eds) 
War and Public Health, (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 30. and White, M. (2012) Selected Death Tolls 
for Wars, Massacres and Atrocities Before the 20th Century. Available at: 
http://necrometrics.com/pre1700a.htm#30YrW, accessed 24/03/2015. 
 
10 Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, p. 171. 
11 al-Juhany, U. M. (2002) Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement: Social Political and Religious Conditions 
during the 3 Centuries Preceding the Rise of the Saudi State, (Berkshire: Ithaca Press).  
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oases and Bedouin communities.12 A zeitgeist of international threat against which elites 
could construct a regime of racketeering in response thus does not seem a convincing 
explanation for the emergence of the Saudi regime. However, whilst Najd lacked the 
necessary precursors to support a pure replication of Tilly’s theory, it did possess a 
widespread perception of risk open to exploitation in the Wahhabi movement. Wahhabism 
emerged in Central Arabia during the 1730s, in response to a wide-spread sense of existential 
anxiety in considerable portions of the region’s population in a manner consistent with 
observations made of numerous religious nationalist movements by both Catarina Kinnvall 
and Mark Juergensmeyer.13  Specifically, the movement’s raison d'être was the elimination 
of religious pluralism, which was seen as creating epistemic uncertainty, corrupting the 
religion and interfering with the divine simplicity of the oneness of the God. Initially, this 
fixated on local paganism and Sufism in Najd, before later shifting to securitise a much more 
diverse array of groups, including other schools of Sunni thought and monotheistic faiths 
such as Christianity. Central to revivalist identity was a utopian hope for the restoration of 
society in imitation of the early Muslim imperial period; a reordering that would provide 
existential certainty, eliminate unnecessary complexity, assign sanctified significance to ends 
and provide canonised means with which to achieve them in a legible and accessible 
manner.14 Practices challenging the absolutist epistemic claims of revivalist orthodoxy were 
vilified as idolatrous and polytheistic and warranting dramatic responses, often violence.15 
Revivalist elites commonly argued that those who undertook such practices were not simply 
                                                          
 
12 Vassiliev, The History Of Saudi Arabia, p. 6. 
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and Co), p. 24. 
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disinterested outsiders, content to live apart from the revivalist community but nefarious 
saboteurs, determined to undermine the foundations of Islam.  
Writing in the early nineteenth century, for example, the prominent scholar, Sulayman 
ibn Abdallah, compared the Hanafi Egyptians to the polytheists of early Islamic legend, 
arguing that such groups ‘would never be satisfied with the Prophet until he would follow 
their religion, and bear witness that they are upon the truth.’16 Revivalism in this form 
represented as a ‘securitisation of subjectivity,’17 where alternative claims to truth from non-
adherent religious communities raised fears of a loss of order, continuity, morality and 
meaning. Such epistemic threats were felt to undermine the essential principals of Islam and 
the associated identity built around them by conservative Sunnis, many of whom gravitated to 
the movement as a means to reassert their sense of self. As Jennifer Mitzen puts it, 
individuals ‘need to ‘make sense of their world’, and when…meanings are unsettled [they] 
suffer…psychological stress.’18 For revivalists, the existence of sectarian diversity unsettled 
these meanings and the Saud-revivalist alliance served to create certainty. From the outset of 
this relationship, the state committed itself to guarding revivalism from non-orthodoxy by 
supporting the enforcement of Wahhabi doctrine and suppressing or eliminating competing 
sectarian claims in the public sphere, creating a utopian safe space in which revivalist identity 
would be unchallenged and hegemonic. In exchange, revivalists were expected to fulfil the 
regime’s extractive demands: troops, taxation and compliance with the centre – although only 
the latter would be relevant by the later twentieth century. While such an arrangement 
superficially may appear as a simple patron/client relationship, such a characterisation 
                                                          
 
16 Abdallah, S. (N/D) The Evidences for the Ruling Regarding Alliances with the Infidels and Matters Related to 
It., (at-Tibyan Publications), p. 82. 
 
17 Kinnvall, Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security, pp. 
741-67. 
 
18 Mitzen, J. (2006) Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma, European 
Journal of International Relations, 12(3), p. 349. 
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obfuscates how the regime sought to create demands for its protection services and how, 
paradoxically, it often existed as the greatest source of threat to the very revivalist identity it 
claimed to defend. 
 
A Model of State Identity Racketeering 
This mode of identity racketeering that the Saudi state employs effectively functions as a 
positive feedback loop as shown in figure one below. This cycle has four sequential stages 
that, collectively, have legitimated the regime with a domestic revivalist client community, a 
key structure of extractive support that has been integral to the formation and growth of the 
state since its first inception in 1744. The first stage of the model concerns the state’s offer of 
protection against ontological insecurities associated with revivalism. Utilising centralised 
organisation in governmental institutions, sanctioned and complicit Islamic scholars, as well 
as through collective demonstrations of piety and physical domination, the state has presented 
itself as a solution to the existential uncertainties posed by divergent sectarian groups and 
socio-cultural shifts away from traditionalism. Originally, this offer focused on shielding 
against local passive pagan and Sufi groups in Najd. Following the first Saudi state, however, 
the subject necessitating protection was shifted to external actors that threatened the political 
interests of the state. Offered protections were often reflexively formed in response to these 
varying interests, but invariably, all invoked a commitment to maintaining the homogenous 
primacy of revivalist traditionalism and ensuring a shield against the corruptive influence of 
these other communities.  
Stage two occurs the acceptance of the state’s offer by the revivalist community as a 
whole. The offer must be presented in such a way that it is found not only convincing by 
complicit revivalist elites, but also wider adherents. This often transpires thanks to the 
complicity of the former, who present the offer to the masses through an interpretation of 
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religious idiom favourable to the regime’s goal. Such a successful transaction legitimates the 
state by reaffirming the movement’s dependency on its paternalism and ensuring access to 
required resources and a stalwart support base it can rely on in times of crisis and upheaval.  
The third stage of racketeering sees the use of centralised organisation to spread and 
maintain the revivalist identity within the client population, ensuring the existence of the 
movement across concurrent generations and maintaining demands for ontological 
protections. Since 1744, the state has achieved this through a number of methods, including 
financing religious educators; constructing infrastructure, including schools and mosques; 
providing material incentives for religious piety and commitment in citizens; and maintaining 
a perennial ‘mystification’ of the public sphere; and preventing the existence of organised 
alternatives to revivalism.19  Central co-ordination was considerably limited until the 
twentieth century and prior to this period the individual actors involved in these praxes were 
often afforded a great deal of autonomy in achieving their mission. Nevertheless, the Saudi 
state remained the critical enabler to the revivalist movement’s prosperity facilitating many 
elite scholars predisposition to supporting the centralisation of authority. The importance of 
the state in ensuring revivalist success was most clearly demonstrated in the movement’s 
fortunes under other regimes who temporarily dominated Najd, such as the Ottomans and the 
Rasheeds, where the doctrine and its proponents were marked by decline and socio-political 
marginalisation.20  
The fourth stage relates to the sources of insecurity for the propagated revivalist 
identity, the largest contributor to which has been the state. As indicated above, this takes 
direct and indirect forms. Deliberate stimulation of threats has existed from the very 
beginning of the state-revivalist alliance through the construction of political rivals as 
                                                          
19 al-Rasheed, M. (2007) Contesting the Saudi State, (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 61. 
 
20 Wagemakers, J. (2012) The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi 
Contestations of al-Wala' wa-l-Bara', Middle East Studies, 44(1) pp. 93-110. 
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epistemic threats. Since the nineteenth, however, indirect factors associated with 
misalignment between ideological fidelity and pragmatic state behaviour have become an 
increasingly prominent source of insecurity for revivalists as a result of the state’s maturation 
and socialisation within the international system. Pragmatic regime policies promoting 
traditional security, economic interdependence and interfaith relations have repeatedly 
undermined the traditionalism central to the epistemic security of many revivalists, a dynamic 
which, at face value, would appear to weaken the foundations of their relationship with the 
state. Nevertheless, because of its dominant socio-religious status and ability to depend on the 
support of Islamic scholars whose status and privilege are dependent on its success, the state 
is able to deflect critiques based on this and portray itself as a force for revivalist continuity, 
rather than a saboteur of that same condition. 
From here, the racketeering cycle starts anew, with the state offering renewed 
protections to the revivalist community as a whole from threats it itself is often the chief 
architect of. While this cycle has not always operated smoothly, it is telling that during its 
entirety of its history, the only large and cohesive revivalist bloc to outright break from the 
racket cycle were the rebellious Ikhwān. For the majority of revivalists under Saudi rule, the 
acceptance of this cycle has been a perennial given since the racket was fully asserted during 




The first state (1744-1818) 
The period of the first Saudi state saw the manifestation of elements of all four components 
of the protection racketeering model. This began with the first stage, as the leadership of the 
Saudi settlement of al-Diriyah offered protections to adherents of the revivalist movement, 
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after the latter had repeatedly experienced exile and ostracisation for their radical views in 
other parts of Najd.21 Alongside providing physical security to the movement, the Saudis 
committed themselves to supporting the spread of revivalist doctrine and maintaining its 
dominance in any public sphere under their sovereignty, a pledge that enabled the regime to 
initiate an expansive conquest of Najd and its surrounds. As stage two of the model predicts, 
the movement was quick to accept such provisions and provided religious legitimation, 
funding and troops for Saudi expansionist conquests, sanctifying these activities as a holy 
task to purify and defend a besieged Islam and demonising the political foes of the regime as 
polytheists and unbelievers who sought to undermine the religion.22  
The third stage was also readily observable under the first state. The Saudi regime 
dedicated considerable energies in propagating revivalism. During expansion, the 
government used the legitimacy derived from its support of the revivalist mission to override 
systems of local tribute with a centralised system of religious tax. Through a portion of this 
growing revenue stream, support was lent to the revivalist elite to further spread and impose 
orthodoxy. Revivalist scholars and judges no longer drew salaries from local benefactors, but 
became employees of the central regime and were ensured privileged roles in the new order.23  
The regime funded the construction of religious infrastructure, such as mosques, that served 
as hubs of demagoguery. Up until this point, the social, political and economic environment 
of Najd for centuries had been typified by fragmentation,24 but alongside conquest, 
inducement and inter-tribal alliance building, the use of third stage racketeering helped grow 
                                                          
21 Abd al-Wahhab, M. i. (2010) The Foundations of Islam: being a translation of Masa'il al-Jahiliyyah allati 
Khalafa fiha Rasulullah Ahla'l-jahiliyyah, (Birmingham: Dar as-Sunnah Publishers), p. 16. 
 
22 Steinberg, G. (2006) The Wahhabi Ulama and the Saudi State: 1745 to Present, in: Aarts, P. & Nonneman, G. 
(eds) Saudi Arabia in the Balance, (London: C. Hurst an Co.), p. 12. 
 
23 Kjorlien, M. L. & Michele, M. L. (1994) State and Religion in Saudi Arabia, The Arab Studies Journal, pp. 36-64. 
 
24 al-Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement: Social Political and Religious Conditions during the 3 
Centuries Preceding the Rise of the Saudi State. 
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the movement and galvanise many disparate actors, allowing for the assertion of a more 
consolidated and coordinated authority across the region.25 This represented an ‘astonishing 
rupture’ with historical trends in the region as, by 1805, the regime had conquered the 
majority of the Arabian Peninsula under its religious mandate, including Mecca and Medina, 
in the process challenging the authority of the Ottoman Empire itself.26  
Although the fourth stage of racketeering was to manifest under the first state, it 
functioned in a less pervasive form than it would under subsequent regimes. The state 
actively supported the construction of its political foes as rivals to the integrity revivalism; 
groups who otherwise likely would have been disinterested in the movement, had it not been 
mobilised against them behind an aggressive and expansive state. Nevertheless, it wasn’t 
until the second state that the fourth stage stimulation would manifest in full, with deliberate 
stoking of revivalist insecurities paired with an indirect dynamic in which pragmatic, a-
ideological decisions of Saudi policy makers had a side-effect of fomenting conditions for 
ontological anxiety. The reasons behind the lack of this element most prominently were tied 
to the unique international conditions in which the first state operated, as it expanded in a 
relative power vacuum and was not forced to make the concessions and accommodations to 
external actors that its predecessor regimes were forced to do. Having few actual relations 
with external states, there was little cause for dissonance between its commitments to the 
revivalist movement and its behaviour as a state. 
From here, the state would begin the cycle of racketeering anew by offering growing 
regimes of protection to adherents as it expanded its territories. Perhaps the most 
controversial of these were the systemic campaigns of violence aimed at eliminating 
symbolic and physical representations of epistemic contestation.  Upon seizing new 
                                                          
25 al-'Uthaymin, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: The Man and his Works, p. 58. 
 
26 Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, p. 32. 
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settlements, the regime oversaw adherents in enacting iconoclasm, destroying artefacts, 
shrines and other items that were seen to challenge the monotheistic claims of revivalism. 
Similarly, individuals seen to be corrupting the religion, be they Sufi, pagan, Shi’a or non-
orthodox Sunni, were often the recipients of harsh, large-scale violence organised by the 
state, perhaps the worst instance of which occurred during a raid on the Shi’a city of Karbala 
in 1802, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths.27 Similar incidents were witnessed in towns 
such as Taif and Zubayr, with the violence rationalised through the rhetoric of religious 
protectionism in the service of revivalist identity demands.28 Here, supporting the assertions 
of Michael Vlahos, systemic violence became a celebration of identity, as competing 
structures of truth were stifled and stamped out, along with the associated doubts they 
presented to revivalism.29 
 
The second state (1824-1891) 
The unprecedented success of the first state’s expansion would prove its undoing. Assertion 
of Saudi authority over Ottoman holdings in Mecca and Medina served to antagonise 
Constantinople and in 1811 Imperial forces landed in Western Arabia and gradually drove the 
Saudis back to Najd over the next seven years. This Saud-Ottoman war represented a 
manifestation of the fourth stage of racketeering, as the war-making activities of the state 
brought an otherwise disinterested Ottoman suzerain into violent contact with the revivalist 
movement. As stage one of the model predicts, scholarly elites complicit with the state 
portrayed the Ottomans not just as invaders, but as religious corrupters who sought to undo 
the regime and the mission. Referring to the Ottomans, the scholar Sulayman ibn Abdallah 
                                                          




28 Trofimov, Y. (2007) The Siege of Mecca, (New York: Doubleday Broadway Publishing Group), p. 17. 
 
29 Vlahos, M. (2008) Fighting Identity: Sacred War and World Change (Westport: Praeger). 
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wrote that ‘the [unbelievers] will never cease fighting the Muslims until they turn them back 
from their [faith].’30 Revivalism under Ottoman rule thus be would compromised, and only 
supporting the current order under Saudi sovereignty could ensure the movement’s prosperity 
and fidelity. Nevertheless, despite a prolonged resistance sustained in part by the revivalist 
call to arms, the superior Ottomans destroyed the last vestiges of Saudi statehood in 1818.   
The Ottomans withdrew from Najd in only a few years and new Saudi authority re-
emerged in 1824, when Turki ibn Abdallah recaptured Riyadh. The position of the state was 
far weaker than its predecessor. Both a growing British presence in the peninsula’s east and 
reinvigorated Ottoman activity to the north and west acted to undermine the state’s 
sovereignty and prevented the expansionism in which both its predecessor and its successor 
had and were to engage.31 This was compounded further by the emergence of local 
competition in the form of the al-Rasheed clan out of Hai’l, who challenged the Saudis for 
control of Najd. In a perpetual state of besiegement, the disposition of the second Emirate 
was thus largely defensive in place of the revolutionary aggressiveness of its predecessor – 
the objective being simply to maintain the integrity of the state, not expand its holdings. 
Despite the new international constraints placed upon the second regime, it rapidly 
resumed its racketeering behaviour. As in stages one, two and three, the state successfully 
presented itself as a protector of the movement and used centrally directed resources 
harvested from this process both to spread religious doctrine and to maintain a revivalist-
dominant social sphere with other sectarian groups supressed. Revivalist elites continued to 
support the regime and delegitimise its opponents as sources of corruption. In one polemic, 
the prominent scholar Abdallah Abd al-Latif wrote that it was incomprehensible that ‘that 
anyone would know [Islam]…yet would not have enmity against the [polytheists] (referring 
                                                          
30 Abdallah, S. (N/D) The Evidences for the Ruling Regarding Alliances with the Infidels and Matters Related to 
It, p. 83.  
 
31 See Wynbrandt, J. (2004) A Brief History Of Saudi Arabia, (New York: Checkmark Books). & 
Quataert, D. (2005) The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
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to the Ottomans and British)]…whoever does not have enmity towards them, then it is not 
said that he knows [Islam] or acts upon it.32 The tone of revivalist discourse shifted in reflex 
to the political conditions of the state from one of conquest and expansion to one of holding 
the line against the idolatry of surrounding threats.33 Similarly, such polemics displayed 
increasing extraversion, as the primary rivals to the state now were international in nature, 
rather than parochial. Nevertheless, the content was essentially the same. The imperial actors 
confronting the second Saudi state were portrayed as potential sources of corruption to the 
religion, in a manner consistent with the characterisation of local Sufis, pagans and Shi’a 
under the first state.34  
While the first three stages of the second state’s racketeering cycle functioned in a 
manner consistent with the previous regime, the stimulation of revivalist insecurities under 
the fourth stage displayed new tendencies toward indirectness. Here, a new dynamic emerged 
around the dissonance between the state’s pragmatic behaviour of survival and its 
commitments to protecting the integrity of revivalist identity. This manifested most 
prominently during the Saudi civil war after 1865, where two sibling claimants to the throne 
engaged in a prolonged struggle. Unable to overcome his brother, the Saudi emir Abdallah 
sought assistance from Ottoman forces in Baghdad to stabilise the state and shore up his own 
rule. While perhaps sensible from a perspective of realpolitik, this decision flagrantly 
contradicted the regime’s commitments to maintaining the ontological securities of its 
revivalist constituents. Through its a-ideological behaviour of survival, the state indirectly 
was facilitating a major source of insecurity for revivalists. The most observable result to this 
was a schism amongst the revivalist scholars, many of whom began to question the 
                                                          
32 Quoted in al-Maqdisi, A. M. (1984) Millat Ibrahim, (at-Tibyan Publications), p. 38. 
 
33 Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, 40-70 
 
34 Firro, T. K. (2013) The Political Context of Early Wahhabi Discourse of Takfir, Middle Eastern Studies, 49(5), 
pp. 770-89. 
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legitimacy of the regime and the authenticity of its commitment to the revivalist cause. While 
this disagreement remained largely academic and failed to translate to the wider revivalist 
community, it was characterised by its vociferous nature and even led to some scholars 
excommunicating one another in a manner previously reserved for the non-adherent sectarian 
communities the movement so loathed.35   
Despite the potential disaster presented by this new face of the fourth stage of 
racketeering, the regime’s offer of religious protection continued to be accepted by the 
majority of revivalists. Indeed, as Tarik K. Firro notes, as the state weakened from internal 
struggle, rival competitors and a devastating famine, religious invocations against the 
Ottoman and British forces became ‘the main instrument to mobilise the masses’ behind the 
regime.36 This tactic, however, ultimately would fail to sustain the second state, and its final 
vestiges were stamped out in 1891 by a briefly ascendant al-Rasheed state.37 
 
The Ikhwān and the failure of the cycle 
A third Saudi state re-emerged shortly after its predecessor’s demise in 1902. The next three 
decades were spent expanding the territories and consolidating internal authority before 
gaining international recognition in 1932. Curiously, the first decade of reconstitution appears 
to have lacked racketeering behaviour, with the regime focused on cultivating intertribal 
alliances through shared economic and conventional security interests in a manner that defies 
the predictive power of the model.38 By 1912, however, the state had resumed racketeering. 
While this cycle occurred much as it had under previous Saudi regimes, it was not always 
                                                          
35  Steinberg, The Wahhabi ulama and the Saudi state: 1745 to the present, p. 19. 
 
36 Firro,  The Political Context of Early Wahhabi Discourse of Takfir, Middle Eastern Studies, 49(5), p. 783. 
 
37 Scott, J. C. (1999) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, 
(Yale: Yale University Press ). 
38  Cronin, S. (2013) Tribes, Coups and Princes: Building a Modern Army in Saudi Arabia, Middle Eastern Studies, 
49(1), p. 6. 
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successful in its implementation. The most blatant case of this occurred with the 
sedentarization of the Najdi Bedouin and the state-backed drive to convert them to revivalism 
in a manner that, had it been successful, would have transformed them into a useful new 
client community of the racket. The nomadic Bedouin had long resisted Saudi authority and 
revivalist teachings.39 To counteract this, the state established a series of agrarian settlements 
in which intensive preaching was conducted by revivalist scholars. The nomads subsequently 
were driven to settle in these farmsteads through a combination of inducement and 
coercion,40 with some estimates suggesting that by 1921, nearly 150,000 Bedouin out the 
entire total Najdi population of 250,000 had been settled.41 Many became enthusiastic 
supporters of the strict orthodoxy under the moniker Ikhwān. Their subsequent military 
activities played a crucial role in expanding Saudi territory and were undertaken in a manner 
consistent with the earlier conquests of the first state under the banner of religious expansion 
and purification.42 The conversion of the Ikhwān displayed many facets of previous instances 
of Saudi racketeering. Through this centrally directed scheme the state and compliant 
religious elites sought to propagate revivalism among the Bedouin as a means of instilling a 
demand for protection services. As the chief patron of the revivalism, the state naturally 
assumed the Ikhwān would accept it as the movement’s protector.  
Although the Ikhwān were successfully brought over to revivalism, however, they 
increasingly came to identify the pragmatic behaviour of the state as blatantly contradicting 
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the tenets of their newfound faith. Of particular contention was the fact that the regime 
tolerated non-orthodox Sunni and Shi’a populations and maintained friendly relations with 
foreign powers. While internal sectarian groups were disallowed from practice in the public 
space under Saudi rule, they remained crucial for the economic prosperity of the state43 and 
were generally compliant with its growing authority.44 This led the regime to turn a blind eye 
to many of the religious and cultural activities of such groups, provided they weren’t 
undertaken overtly.45 Similarly, the experiences of the previous regimes made clear the 
necessity of forming amicable ties with powerful states such as Britain and the United States.  
Despite the pragmatism of these policies, however, their a-ideological nature seriously 
weakened the credibility of the offers under the first stage of racketeering for the Ikhwān, 
with the state seen as colluding with the very sources of insecurity it claimed to protect 
against. This grievance was exacerbated by the growing antipathy of the Ikhwān toward the 
regime, thanks to a number of other economic and political grievances.46 In late 1926, the 
racketeering cycle collapsed, with the second stage failing to take hold as a number of Ikhwān 
leaders rejected the state’s offer of protection in a list of charges that stressed its failure to 
safeguard revivalism. Among these indictments was Riyadh’s insufferable diplomatic 
relations with infidel powers, as well as its ongoing toleration of the Shi’a.47 This dissonance 
between state activity and the Ikhwān’s religious expectations contributed to a subsequent 
three-year rebellion beginning in 1927. While the state would continue to sustain a cycle of 
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racketeering, the Ikhwān experience demonstrated the potential hazards that it could face 
from its own potential constituents if this loop was not managed effectively, issues hinted at, 
but never fully realised under the second state. 
 
Institutionalisation, Cold War Rivals and further Contradictions 
Following the surrender of the rebels, the regime entered a period of prolonged stability over 
the next three decades. Despite the disaster of the Ikhwān case, the state’s behaviour as a 
racketeer continued throughout the 1930s. Following the discovery of large oil deposits in 
1938, the protections offered increasingly institutionalised within the formal structures of the 
state.48 A significant instance of this occured in 1940, with the establishment of an official 
religious policing organisation, known as the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the 
Prevention of Vice (CPVPV). Religious policing always had been central to the compact 
between the revivalist movement and the regime, but, prior to 1940, local scholars, who 
retained considerable personal autonomy despite drawing their salary from the state, 
generally directed this activity. While integral to the racket, the independence of these agents 
could lead to disastrous outcomes, as in the case of the Ikhwān, who had ultimately come to 
view themselves the true enforcers of revivalism. The creation of the CPVPV aimed to 
maintain the first stage offer of protections by the state, but was to be subordinated centrally 
within the regime’s growing bureaucracy in a manner that limited the individual power and 
autonomy of religious enforcers.49 Although this did not end the personal influence of 
CPVPV officers, it emplaced institutional restrictions that ensured they were beholden to an 
authority above their own.  
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During the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, numerous other formal religious organisations 
emerged, particularly in public morality, law and education – arenas crucial to sustaining the 
revivalist doctrine and projecting the state’s commitment to the movement. This era 
culminated in 1972 with the foundation of the council of senior Islamic scholars, a body 
designed to advise the government authoritatively on religious issues and to provide revivalist 
sanction for state activities.50 Each of these religious organizations would further develop 
alongside other modernization initiatives undertaken during this period, while helping to 
maintain the state’s longstanding offer to ensure revivalism would retain a place of privilege 
under Saudi rule.  
As rentier largesse became a new feature of Saudi rule, the needs of extraction 
through racketeering lessened to solely that of the public’s compliance with the regime. With 
the diminishing need to tax constituents during this period51 and the growing capacity of the 
state to provide for their material welfare, the necessity of the racketeering cycle to legitimate 
the state lessened. Nevertheless, patronage of revivalism afforded the regime the ability to 
demonize continually its opposition in terms familiar to many in the Saudi populace. As 
numerous scholars have noted, the construction of political opponents of the Saudi regime as 
sources of insecurity for the movement persisted throughout the Cold War.52 The kingdom 
felt particularly vulnerable to the revolutionary ideologies of pan-Arabism and Nasserism that 
were reaching their dynamic zenith in the late 1950s.53 To counteract the threat domestically, 
Riyadh relied on the well-established tactic of stoking the movement’s latent hostility toward 
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innovation to reconstruct the emergent ideas of secular universalism into ontological threats, 
while simultaneously offering itself as a panacea against these same forces. In this narrative, 
Ba’athists, Arab nationalists, Nasserists and Communists were aggregated into a singular, 
godless menace.54 As under the second state, revivalist scholars rallied to discourage 
interactions between believers and those subscribing to ideologies which were claimed to 
‘contradict the spirit of Islam.’55 In an echo of Abd al-Latif’s comments on the Ottomans and 
the British, the future grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, declared that such 
unbelievers could not ‘be fellow brothers of the Muslims,’ that it was ‘impermissible to 
consider them friends,’ and that true believers should ‘hate them for Allah.’56 The focus of 
such constructions would shift again to a new emphasis on the Shi’a in 1979 with the decline 
of Arab nationalist regimes and the rise of revolutionary Iran.57 
Contrasting against the infidelity of the external world, the state continued to claim 
itself as a bastion of traditionalism, even while overseeing its own rapid modernisation in 
contradiction to these credentials. As major initiatives began in the 1960s, future monarch 
Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz stated that ‘[the] government is fully aware of the need to make 
serious efforts for the propagation and encouragement of Islam and its protections by words 
and deeds’58 and indicated that the regime was committed to ‘[maintaining] economic and 
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social stability within the existing religious and social framework.’59 One of the primary 
means to achieving this became the sustainment of a heavy religious curriculum in national 
education, in which revivalist scholars were given leeway in order to perpetuate the 
movement’s tenets in subsequent generations.60 Such a policy functioned in all stages of the 
racket: The state offering protections to the community in a commitment to preserving 
traditionalism; the acceptance of such offers by the majority of the revivalist elite and the 
community who in turn would reaffirm their own commitment to the state; the propagation of 
revivalist identity through the policy itself; and the use of the religious curriculum to continue 
to frame political rivals of the regime as threats to the movement.  
Despite attempts to maintain a cycle of racketeering during this period, the 
contradictory behaviour of the regime in its pragmatic, a-ideological policies, in tandem with 
other factors such as economic downturn and policing crackdowns, could see its offers of 
protection rebuffed by revivalist subgroups in a manner that could lead to open confrontation. 
Two major incidents of this kind occurred during and around the Cold War. The first was the 
1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by radical millenarian Islamists who had 
adopted the familiar title al-Ikhwān. While the motivations for this attack were diverse,61 a 
major source of inspiration was the religio-cultural corruption of Saudi society by external 
influences, which the regime had failed in its duty to prevent. While occurring at the same 
time as other revolutionary movements in the Islamic world, Joseph Kechichian has argued 
that the ideology of al-Ikhwān was very closely aligned with many of the foundational 
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principles of revivalism.62 As a result, the organization’s grievances against the state were 
formulated in many of these same terms, albeit in a radicalized and eschatological fashion. 
Another notable rebuff came in the form of the Saudi Islamist Sahwa (Awakening) 
movement, which confronted the regime in the early 1990s with a series of mass protests. As 
with the Ikhwān and the al-Ikhwān, the motivations of the Sahwa were varied, and ranged 
from poor economic opportunities, to the influence of a community of foreign Muslim 
Brotherhood political dissidents living inside the kingdom.63 Nevertheless, a key motivator 
behind the Sahwa’s activities had been a perceived lack of commitment to upholding the 
tenets of revivalism, particularly focused on the decision to permit the entry of Western 
forces into the kingdom during the 1990/91 Gulf War and the resulting influence this had on 
Saudi society. Along with the experience of the Ikhwān, these two experiences showcased 
how racketeering could backfire on the regime. While each of these incidents had their own 
distinct set of idiosyncratic motivations, each showed how the state’s failure to meet demands 
generated through the racketeering process could help stimulate mobilisation against it in a 
kind of religio-political Frankenstein’s monster fashion. Today, this phenomenon may go 
some way in explaining the meteoric rise of the Islamic State, an organisation that itself 
claims to be pursuing a revivalist ideal of statehood similar to the discourse of the original 
Saudi state and which is reported to contain a disproportionately large number of Saudi 
citizens in its ranks.64 
 
Racketeering and the post-Arab Spring world 
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The process of racketeering has been central in Saudi efforts to contain the Arab Spring and a 
prominent feature of its geopolitical rivalry with Iran since 2011.  The Saudi state continues 
to offer protection against unbelief and corruption to the estimated four million revivalists of 
its population who remain largely compliant with its patronage.65 At the same time, 
considerable state resources remain dedicated to cultivate religiosity in the public through 
education, moral and legal enforcement and mystification of the public sphere. The 
constructions of enemies as unclean threats to the integrity of the religion remains normal, as 
does the contradiction between the regime’s religious commitments and many of its 
pragmatic policies concerning security, economic development and international relations.  
As Saudi Arabia faced the Arab Spring in 2011, it sought to promote a sectarian 
narrative based on Shi’a ascendency that simultaneously would delegitimize oppositional 
groups and be readily accepted by the revivalist community. As Raihan Ismail puts it in the 
case of Bahrain, ‘[the] Saudi religious establishment [promoted] Sunni solidarity against the 
‘deviant’ Shi’a, thus defining the…uprisings as a sectarian conflict.’66 A similar approach 
was applied at home against any political resistance in what Madawi al-Rasheed has termed 
‘sectarianism as counter-revolution.’67 Interpreted through the logic of racketeering, this 
approach sought to tap into the long-cultivated hostilities of revivalism toward religious 
heterogeneity by constructing challenges to the regime’s authority as threats to the 
community, offering protections to this threat in exchange for the extraction of loyalty and 
support for the regime. 
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Similar to the Arab Spring, the Saudi war with rebel Houthis in Yemen, interpreted by 
elites as a proxy conflict with Iran, has been portrayed as the latest front in the state’s defence 
of the faith.68 In March of 2015, the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars declared the conflict 
as religious in nature and that any soldier dying in Yemen would be considered a martyr. In 
their statement they emphasised the sacred, defensive nature of the conflict, stating that 
‘[one] of the greatest ways to draw closer to God almighty is to defend the sanctity of religion 
and Muslims.’69  Similarly, Grand Mufti al ash-Sheikh characterised the conflict as a drive to 
stop a ‘Safavid march.’70 As in many previous instances, the state sought to present its rivals, 
in this case the Shi’a Houthis, as un-Islamic corrupters of the faith, while vindicating and 
drawing support for its own actions as part of a wider effort to protect the integrity of the 
revivalist project.  
 
Conclusion 
Although the above model has reductionist features, it highlights a number of important 
logical continuities behind the Saudi state’s use of religious revivalism as a tool of 
legitimation and governance. While the precise focus and idiosyncrasies of the Saudi state’s 
relationship with the revivalist movement undoubtedly has altered since 1744, the functional 
political outcome and overarching behaviour surrounding this patronage has displayed a 
remarkable cyclical consistency. This points to a four-point logic of instrumental protection 
racketeering on the regime’s part, rather than adherence to ideological fidelity. Regardless of 
                                                          
 
68 Akhbaar24 (2015) Tarifi: Jihad against the Houthi is a religious duty. Available at: 
http://akhbaar24.argaam.com/article/detail/186895, accessed 05/01/2017. 
 
69 Batrawy, A. (2015) Clerics In Saudi Arabia, Iran Cast Political Rivalry Over Yemen As Sectarian Struggle. The 
Huffington Post. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/16/saudi-iran-rivalry-
sectarianism_n_7081880.html, accessed 05/01/2017. 
 
70 Sons, S. & Matthiesen, T. (2016) The Yemen War in Saudi Media. Muftah. Available at: 
http://muftah.org/yemen-war-saudi-media/#.WG3bcfl96Um, accessed 05/01/2017. 
 25 
the conditions in which it has found itself, the Saudi regime has striven to offer the revivalist 
movement a sense of protection against religious pluralism and heterogeneity, an offer that 
largely has been accepted since 1744 by the majority of the community in their compliance 
with the various systems of state extraction. Similarly, the state, regardless of whether it is in 
a position of prosperity or decline, has propagated revivalist identity to create a perennial 
demand for these same services of protection. Through this, the state consistently has sought 
to exploit this fertile socio-religious ground to construct its political rivals as sources of 
ontological insecurity that it then can use to justify renewed offers of protection. In the 
majority of these cases, the subjects of this securitization have little to no direct interest in 
interfering with revivalist doctrine, yet repeatedly, the revivalist community has accepted 
such a narrative.  At the same time, despite the commitments engendered by the racket, the 
regime typically will opt for pragmatic policies of survival over maintaining ideological 
fidelity when forced to choose between the two. Thus the regime, despite its protestations to 
the contrary, has acted as the eminent stimulus for change, innovation and other activities that 
contradict the traditionalist focus of revivalist doctrine, a tendency that has led it to be 
perceived by numerous subgroups of adherents as the primary challenge to their religious 
integrity. 
In short, to return to Tilly, the Saudi state provides a shield against the danger of 
ontological insecurity, but at the same time has significant control over when that danger 
appears and often has exercised this capacity to produce such threat when it sees political 
advantage in doing so.71 The implications of the Saudi state as a racketeer of revivalist 
identity are many. In one respect, the cycle helps to explain the state’s general reluctance to 
oversee any major initiatives aimed at social liberalisation and interfaith relations. In regard 
to gender equality, the regime’s ability to rely heavily on the profits of oil have helped to 
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retard the socio-economic impetus for reforms that would impart women with increasing 
agency in the public sphere, while at the same time its commitments to maintaining the 
traditional patriarchal values of revivalism as a form of protection present a degree of risk for 
any policy maker wishing to drive this process quickly forward. Likewise, the promotion of 
interfaith relations and tolerance both inside and outside the kingdom also is curtailed 
severely by the cycle of racketeering, particularly when the state feels under threat and sees a 
need to reinvigorate the practice. Prior to the Arab Spring, for example, then-King Abdullah 
sponsored a series of national dialogues to develop understanding between Sunni and Shi’a 
communities. Soon after the outbreak of protests in 2011, however, Riyadh quickly reversed 
course on this initiative and instead framed the Shi’a as a religio-political threat to the 
revivalist community. As Matthiesen puts it, any semblance of mutual respect for diversity 
was ‘replaced by bigotry and sectarian hatred.’72 In this case, the temptation to construct the 
Saudi Shi’a as a potential threat to the wider revivalist community and harvest legitimacy for 
the regime was far greater than the prospect of a society in which the two groups existed 
harmoniously. 
The protection racketeering system, repeatedly tested, has proven arguably the longest 
standing source of power and prestige for the Saudi regime. While the state may make minor 
concessions to external powers and advocates of human rights, social liberalisation and inter-
faith relations, it likely will continue to promote a hard-line revivalist identity in its citizenry 
in order to ensure ongoing survival. The racketeering system, for all its flaws, produced a net 
positive of results for the regime during times of political crisis and pressure, remaining an 
integral component of its absolutist hold on power. While the contradictions of this system 
have led to political confrontations in the past, the regime has managed to navigate all of 
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these successfully.  Given the current turmoil of the Middle East, it is difficult to predict with 
any certainty the challenges the Saudi state will face over the next few decades, but what the 
continuities of the past three centuries suggest is that racketeering will remain a central pillar 
of the regime’s strategy for legitimation for the foreseeable future. 
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